Second-degree moral hazard in a real-world credence goods market by BALAFOUTAS, Loukas et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECO 2013/08 
Department of Economics 
 
SECOND-DEGREE MORAL HAZARD IN  
A REAL-WORLD CREDENCE GOODS MARKET 
Loukas Balafoutas, Rudolf Kerschbamer and Matthias Sutter 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Department of Economics 
 
 
Second-Degree Moral Hazard in a  
Real-World Credence Goods Market 
 
Loukas Balafoutas, Rudolf Kerschbamer and Matthias Sutter 
EUI Working Paper ECO 2013/08 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. 
 
ISSN 1725-6704 
 
© Loukas Balafoutas, Rudolf Kerschbamer and Matthias Sutter, 2013 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
1 
 
Second-Degree Moral Hazard in a Real-World Credence 
Goods Market
 
Loukas Balafoutas 
University of Innsbruck 
Rudolf Kerschbamer 
University of Innsbruck 
Matthias Sutter# 
European University Institute Florence, IZA Bonn, and CESifo Munich 
Abstract 
Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric 
information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field 
experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard – 
the tendency of the supply side in a market to react to anticipated moral hazard on the demand 
side by increasing the extent or the price of the service. In the market for taxi rides, our moral 
hazard manipulation consists of some passengers explicitly stating that their expenses will be 
reimbursed by their employer. This has an economically important and statistically significant 
positive effect on the likelihood of overcharging, with passengers in that treatment being 
about 13% more likely to pay higher-than-justified prices for a given ride. This indicates that 
second-degree moral hazard may have a substantial impact on service provision in a credence 
goods market. 
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1. Introduction 
Studying the crucial role of asymmetric information on market outcomes has a long tradition 
in economic theory, in particular in models that demonstrate market failure when 
asymmetrically informed agents interact with each other. The phenomenon known as moral 
hazard (Pauly, 1974; Holmstrom, 1979) generally states that agents who do not bear full 
responsibility for the costs or risks associated with their actions will tend to exercise less 
effort to reduce these costs. When applied to markets for insurance, the moral hazard 
hypothesis states that agents with a more comprehensive insurance coverage have less 
incentive to avoid exposure to risk, meaning that insured events will more often realize with 
fully insured agents than among those with imperfect or no coverage. A number of empirical 
studies have tested for the presence of moral hazard in markets plagued by asymmetric 
information, with generally mixed results. For instance, Chiappori et al. (1998) and Einav et 
al. (2013) find some evidence of moral hazard in the demand for medical services and for 
health insurance, while Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Doran et al. (2005) reject the moral 
hazard hypothesis in the markets for prescription medicine and for automobile insurance, 
respectively.  
 In an organizational context, moral hazard can manifest itself in the relation between 
owners and managers of a firm in the case of misaligned incentives and unobservable 
employee effort, for instance (Grossman and Hart, 1983; Mookherjee, 1984).1 One example 
of employee effort that is subject to moral hazard is the investment in cost-reduction 
regarding expense accounts, travel costs, and company cars or, more generally, any “hidden” 
effort geared towards cost minimization. The presence of moral hazard in this particular 
context is an important consideration among practitioners in the field.2 
The existing empirical studies on moral hazard focus exclusively on the direct impact 
of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thereby ignoring possible repercussion 
effects. As an illustration consider the market for health care services and assume that the 
consumer of the service – in this case, a patient – is fully insured and interacts with a seller of 
the service – in this case, a physician. Moral hazard implies that the patient may have 
incentives to demand more of the service than required (by asking for more numerous or more 
extensive tests or treatments), since she will not bear its costs. However, the behavior of the 
                                                 
1 See also Itoh (2004) and Bartling and von Siemens (2010) for models that incorporate social comparisons into 
the principal-agent setting. 
2 See, for example, a CNN report on expense account fraud and the extent to which business travelers tend to 
inflate their expenses (including taxi receipts): http://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/05/travel/expense-account-
business-travel/index.html.  
3 
 
physician may also be affected by the extent of the coverage: if the physician expects that the 
patient is not concerned about minimizing costs, he may be more inclined to suggest or 
prescribe more expensive treatments. Notice that the two stories – which we will call first-
degree moral hazard and second-degree moral hazard – are observationally equivalent in 
terms of final outcomes, in the sense that more extensive insurance coverage leads to higher 
expenditure, but the mechanisms are different. While first-degree moral hazard operates 
through the demand side, second-degree moral hazard increases expenditure through supplier-
induced demand – the artificial increase in demand induced by the actions of the seller.  
A similar second-degree moral hazard story also applies to the above example on the 
lack of cost-minimizing incentives by firm employees. Consider the case of an employee who 
must travel for work purposes and is responsible for booking the tickets himself. Since he will 
be fully reimbursed for his expenses, his incentives for finding and buying the lowest fare are 
weak (first-degree moral hazard). Moreover, if he visits a travel agent and informs her of the 
purpose of travel, the agent may deliberately suggest only expensive travel options or charge a 
higher than justified commission, anticipating that the employee will not put any effort into 
monitoring or protesting the agent’s actions (second-degree moral hazard). 
In this paper we present the findings from a field experiment that studies the impact of 
full reimbursement (or coverage) of expenses on ex post realized expenditures induced by the 
actions of the service provider – and not of the consumer. To our knowledge this is the first 
study to examine the possibility that second-degree moral hazard may be partly responsible 
for the positive correlation between coverage and realized expenditure. A further contribution 
of our paper is that, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first to use a controlled field 
experiment to study (second-degree) moral hazard and its impact on market outcomes (for a 
general discussion on field experiments and the advantages of this methodology, see List, 
2006, and List and Reiley, 2008).  
We have conducted our study in the market for taxi (cab) rides. In the case of taxi 
rides in an unknown city, the service traded on the market is a credence good (Darbi and 
Karni, 1973), meaning that an expert seller possesses superior information about the needs of 
the consumer.3 In particular, the driver knows the correct route to a destination while the 
consumer does not. This property of credence goods opens the door to different types of 
fraud: overtreatment occurs when the consumer receives more extensive treatment than what 
is necessary to meet her needs (with taxi rides, this amounts to a detour); in the opposite case 
                                                 
3 For some theoretical and experimental work on the properties of credence goods markets see Dulleck and 
Kerschbamer (2006), and Dulleck et al. (2011). Related work on the effects of informational asymmetries in 
experience goods markets is by Huck et al. (2007, 2012). 
4 
 
of undertreatment, the service provided is not enough to satisfy the consumer (i.e., she does 
not reach her destination); finally, in credence goods markets where the consumer is unable to 
observe the quality he has received, there might also be an overcharging incentive, meaning 
that the price charged by the seller is too high given the service that has been provided.  
In the context of credence goods markets such as taxi rides or medical and repair 
services, second-degree moral hazard seems particularly relevant because the informational 
asymmetries present in such markets facilitate supplier-induced demand, or even fraud (see 
Sülzle and Wambach, 2005 for a theoretical model). In a recent field experiment, Balafoutas 
et al. (2013) have examined the role of information in the market for taxi rides and established 
that fraud by taxi drivers is very systematic in the sense that it increases with the extent of the 
informational asymmetry between the seller (driver) and the consumer (passenger). This 
paper uses a methodology very similar to that in Balafoutas et al. (2013), but applies it to the 
research questions discussed above.4,5 
Specifically, in our study a team of research assistants took 256 undercover taxi rides 
in the capital city of Greece, Athens. The assistants, acting as passengers on eleven different 
routes throughout the city, always revealed to the driver that they were unfamiliar with the 
city, thus giving the taxi ride characteristics of a typical credence good. Our main 
experimental variation consisted solely of a short phrase in one of the two treatments, in 
which the passengers indicated that they needed a receipt in order to have their expenses 
reimbursed by their employer. We call this the “moral hazard treatment”, in the sense that the 
passenger conveyed the impression of not being personally incurring the costs of the fare and 
was therefore arguably perceived by the driver as less likely to notice, or report, fraudulent 
behavior on his side.  
We find that our moral hazard manipulation has an economically pronounced and 
statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood of overcharging, with passengers in 
that treatment being about 13% more likely to pay higher-than-justified prices for a given 
ride. This also leads to higher consumer expenditures in this treatment, on average. At the 
same time, the rate of overtreatment (by taking detours) does not differ across treatments, 
                                                 
4 There is an interesting literature on the labor supply of (New York City) taxi drivers (see, e.g., Camerer et al., 
1997; Farber, 2005, 2008; Crawford and Meng, 2011). However, this literature remains silent on the question 
of whether and to which extent taxi drivers exploit their informational advantage over customers in the 
provision of this credence good. Hence, we are not going into the details of these studies. 
5 Schneider (2010) and Jackson and Schneider (2011) use data from New York City taxi drivers in order to 
estimate the extent and determinants of moral hazard in a different dimension, namely in the relationship 
between owners and lessees of vehicles. As we explain in section 2.2, this aspect is not relevant in the 
environment of our study. 
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something which – as we will argue – is consistent with our hypothesis regarding the way that 
moral hazard impacts behavior in this kind of market. 
Before we proceed to describe in detail the experiment and its findings, we would like 
to stress once more that this paper is not a test of (first-degree) moral hazard according to its 
textbook definition (a privately informed party takes a hidden action that increases her risk 
exposure because she knows that she will not bear the costs of the risk). As a matter of fact, 
first-degree or direct moral hazard (on the consumer side) is ruled out in this experiment since 
the behavior of the passengers is exogenously controlled by the experimenters and kept 
constant across treatments. Our research question is how the perception that moral hazard 
exists in the relationship between the consumer and the reimbursing employer affects the 
seller of the service. We have called this mechanism second-degree moral hazard, and 
whenever the term moral hazard shows up in the following it refers to this kind of mechanism.  
 
2. Experimental Design and Implementation 
2.1. Experimental Methods 
The field experiment was run by means of taking undercover taxi rides. Our four research 
assistants presented themselves as customers and documented the driving and charging 
decisions of taxi drivers (who were unaware that their behavior was being studied). Each 
observation consisted of an assistant entering a taxi and requesting to be taken to a particular 
destination, following a fixed script: “I would like to get to [name of destination]. Do you 
know where it is? I am not from Athens.” This is the script used in Balafoutas et al. (2013) for 
the role of non-local native passengers – i.e., for passengers who speak the native language 
but clearly indicate to the driver that they are not familiar with the city. Arguably, this means 
that the taxi ride is considered a credence good by the driver, in the sense that the driver 
expects to have an informational advantage that he or she may try to exploit.6  
We implemented two treatments. In the Control Treatment (henceforth CTR), a few 
seconds after the ride had begun the passenger added the following question to the driver: 
“Can I get a receipt at the end of the ride?” In the Moral Hazard Treatment (henceforth 
MOH) the same question was supplemented by a short phrase explaining that the passenger 
would have his or her expenses reimbursed: “Can I get a receipt at the end of the ride? I need 
                                                 
6 This is in sharp contrast to the field study by Castillo et al. (2013) on gender differences in bargaining 
outcomes in the market for taxi-cab rides in Lima, Peru. In that study the undercover customers are locals who 
know the shortest route to their destination. This implies that the core credence good problem in the market for 
taxi rides (overtreatment in the form of taking circuitous routes) is absent. Also, taxis in Lima do not have posted 
prices and meters – prices are rather set by face-to-face negotiations. This implies that overcharging is not an 
issue in the Lima study either. 
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it in order to have my expenses reimbursed by my employer.” The two treatments were 
exactly identical except for this brief additional phrase, allowing us to identify the potential 
effects of this revealed information. Our hypothesis is that fraudulent behavior will be more 
prevalent or more pronounced in the moral hazard treatment, since – as explained in the 
introduction – drivers may infer that passengers in this treatment have weak incentives to 
control, or to report, overtreatment or overcharging.7 Even though our hypothesis does not 
differentiate between the two fraud dimensions (overtreatment and overcharging) and predicts 
that both will be more widespread or more pronounced in treatment MOH, there are good 
reasons to expect that drivers will respond more intensively in the overcharging dimension. 
We will outline these reasons in section 3.4. 
In addition to this treatment manipulation, we investigated gender effects in service 
provision and the potential interaction of gender and moral hazard by recruiting two male and 
two female research assistants. Even though we had no formal prior hypothesis regarding the 
role of gender in the context of this experiment, intuition might lead one to expect that women 
fall victim to fraud more often than men, for instance, because they are perceived as less 
likely to engage in confrontation with the driver. Table 1 summarizes our design (including 
the number of collected observations). 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Rides were always taken in quadruples in the sense that all four assistants took taxis 
from the same origin to the same destination, in intervals of one to two minutes between each 
other. This design feature was implemented in order to control for factors unrelated to the 
treatment manipulation but possibly related to the optimal route and to the price of the ride, 
such as traffic and weather conditions, unforeseen or time-specific events such as closed 
roads, etc. Within each quadruple, the order of entering the taxi was random, and two 
passengers (one female and one male) enacted the control treatment, while the other two 
enacted the moral hazard treatment. As a result, all four cells of the experimental design 
(Table 1) are represented in each quadruple.  
 
2.2. The Market Environment 
The market for taxi rides is regulated nationwide in Greece, both in market entry and the tariff 
system. A government authority issues taxi licenses as perpetuities for their holders. 
                                                 
7 Note that reporting fraud to transportation authorities can, in principle, lead to the loss of a taxi license. 
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Currently, approximately 14,000 taxi licenses are valid in Athens, implying a ratio of roughly 
350 taxis per 100,000 inhabitants. This is a considerably larger supply than, for instance, in 
London with 280 taxis, Berlin with 210 taxis, New York City with 160 taxis (yellow cabs 
only), or the whole U.S. with around 110 taxis per 100,000 inhabitants.8 
The tariff system is regulated such that there is a fixed fee of €1.19 and a variable part. 
The variable part is either distance-dependent – in this case the tariff is €0.68 per kilometer 
during daytime (i.e., from 5 a.m. until midnight) and €1.19 per kilometer during nighttime – 
or duration-dependent – then it yields €0.1808 per minute both during daytime and during 
nighttime. The algorithm for charging is standardized nationwide in all taximeters and 
switches automatically to the counting method (distance-dependent vs. duration-dependent) 
that is more profitable for the driver. Given the large supply of taxis in Athens, drivers 
typically have to queue for passengers for long periods of time. This implies that it is 
generally by far more profitable for a taxi driver to take a passenger on a detour – thus 
providing overtreatment – than to choose the shortest and quickest route in the hope to 
accumulate many fixed fees. Moreover, abstracting from possible punishment, there are clear 
incentives for overcharging, since it increases the driver’s revenue without affecting the cost 
of service. Note that the marginal incentives of taxi drivers to engage in fraud of any type are 
practically identical both for owners of the taxi and those drivers who lease the vehicle, 
because leasing a taxi comes at a fixed cost (of roughly €35 per shift; see www.satataxi.gr). 
Therefore, taxi drivers are always residual claimants, meaning that the possible profits from 
fraud are reaped by themselves. 
Since January 2013, every consumer in Greece has the right to refuse payment for a 
transaction of a good or service if a legal receipt has not been issued. Accordingly, every taxi 
is equipped with a small cash register, which is connected to the taximeter and automatically 
produces a receipt at the end of each ride. This implies that asking for a receipt should have 
no effect per se, and in fact our assistants only did so to have an anchor for adding the phrase 
explaining that they are having their expenses reimbursed (in the moral hazard treatment) and 
to keep the script identical across treatments as much as possible. 
 
2.3. Dataset 
The experiment was conducted during nine days in March 2013, covering each day of the 
week at least once. All rides were taken between 8 am and midnight on eleven different routes 
                                                 
8 Source: Own calculations, based on numbers from The New York City Taxicab Fact Book (2006), 
“Transportation for London” (http://www.tfl.gov.uk/businessandpartners/taxisandprivatehire/1380.aspx), “Taxi 
Innung Berlin” (http://www.taxiinnung.org/Taxi-Bestellen.24.0.html), and Schaller (2005). 
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throughout the city of Athens, randomizing among routes during the day (meaning that data 
on each route were collected during several days, and that several routes were driven each 
day, in random order).9 We collected a total of 256 observations, organized in 64 quadruples 
of (almost) simultaneous rides. The mean length of a ride was 15.78 kilometers and the mean 
duration was 23.7 minutes, thus amounting to a total of about 4,040 kilometers and 101 hours 
of driving. 
For each observation our assistants collected the following data: date and time at the 
start of the ride; route; duration; distance driven; total price (fare) paid; gender and 
approximate age of the driver; vehicle manufacturer; weather and traffic conditions. 
The exact distance driven was measured with a portable GPS satellite logger (see 
Picture A.1 in the Appendix) that records the chosen route and the taxi’s exact position and 
speed at each point in time. With these data, we could quantify overtreatment in the form of 
detours and determine the correct fare for the driven distance. From that we created an 
overcharging indicator, which is one if a driver asked for more than justified by the driven 
distance and zero otherwise. In order to classify the source of overcharging, we resorted to the 
detailed information collected by our assistants, describing whether the driver artificially 
increased the fare for a given ride (e.g., by demanding unjustified extras or applying an 
incorrect tariff). We also computed the overcharging amount, defined as the difference 
between the total price and the price that should have been paid for the actually driven 
distance – or, in other words, the amount by which the customer was cheated (on top of 
potential overtreatment through detours). We classify an observation as a case of 
overcharging if the amount of this mark-up is at least 5% of the total price paid, noting that all 
our results are robust to extending the definition of overcharging to include lower amounts.10  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Overtreatment 
In order to quantify overtreatment we have constructed an overtreatment index by dividing the 
distance in each observation by the minimum distance recorded in that particular quadruple. 
The index thus controls for all unobserved characteristics related to driving conditions (such 
as traffic). A potential drawback of the index is that cases where overtreatment takes place in 
all four rides within a quadruple would lead to an underestimation of overtreatment. We 
                                                 
9 For a list of all routes and brief description of the points of origin and destination, please refer to Tables A.1 
and A.2 in the appendix. 
10 Note that the experimenters always paid exactly the price the taxi driver requested. They never gave any tip, 
and taxi drivers never asked for any. 
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therefore check the robustness of our findings in this respect by also presenting an alternative 
overtreatment index, which normalizes the distance in each observation by the minimum 
possible distance for the route. To identify the minimum possible distance we used data from 
google maps and also drove all the routes ourselves, following the directions of the navigation 
system “TomTom”.  
The values of the two overtreatment indices by treatment and gender are shown in 
Table 2. No substantial differences are observed across treatments or across gender, and this 
impression is confirmed by statistical tests. In particular, we test for treatment differences by 
taking the mean value of the index for the two passengers in CTR in a given quadruple and 
comparing it with the mean value of the two passengers in MOH in the same quadruple, in 
order to account for the fact that observations are not independent within each quadruple due 
to the way the overtreatment index is constructed. This leads to a total of 64 observations on 
paired samples and the null hypothesis of no significant treatment difference is not rejected by 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests (p = 0.70 for both overtreatment indices).11 Moreover, men and 
women are also not taken on rides of different length, on average. Hence, we are led to 
conclude that our treatment manipulation has had no detectable effect on the first dimension 
of fraud, overtreatment.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 We also note that we observe no treatment differences with respect to the mean 
duration of a ride, which could in principle be shorter if drivers made efforts to take shortcuts, 
or longer if they chose routes on which they expected to encounter heavy traffic. There is no 
evidence of such effects in our data: the mean duration index (defined as the duration of a ride 
divided by the minimum duration in that quadruple) is 1.14 both in MOH and in CTR (p = 
0.97, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test). 
 
3.2. Overcharging and Total Fare 
The values in Table 3 report the frequency with which drivers overcharged their customers. In 
total, some form of overcharging was observed in 74 of 256 rides, or in 28.9% of all cases.12 
In the large majority of these cases (53 out of 74, or 71.6%) bogus surcharges were applied, 
                                                 
11 All the p-values reported in the paper refer to two-sided tests. 
12 In Balafoutas et al. (2013), the overall overcharging rate is 11.2%, and therewith considerably lower. 
However, the only clean comparison (with identical treatment conditions) is between male non-local natives in 
Balafoutas et al. (2013) – with 7.8% overcharging rate – and male experimenters in the CTR-condition here – 
with 14.1% overcharging rate. This difference is not significantly different according to a ²-test (p > 0.1). 
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namely higher-than-justified extras from and to the airport, the port, the railway station and 
the bus station. The second most frequent source of overcharging (eleven cases) were 
manipulated taximeters or the use of the night tariff during daytime, while rounding-up (not 
tipping!) of the price (by more than 5%) accounted for the remaining ten cases of 
overcharging. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The comparison between the two treatments reveals that overcharging was much more 
frequent in the moral hazard treatment (35.2% vs. 22.7%; p = 0.038, Fisher’s exact test). We 
view this as the single most important finding of our study, because it points towards a 
statistically significant and economically important causal effect of second-degree moral 
hazard on market outcomes in the credence goods setting under consideration. 
Disaggregating by gender gives a more nuanced impression of this treatment effect. 
As it turns out, in the control treatment women face overcharging more frequently than men 
(32% vs. 25.8%; p = 0.034, Fisher’s exact test), but at the same time the charging behavior 
towards them is much less responsive to our moral hazard manipulation. While the rate of 
overcharging increases by less than 2 percentage points for women in treatment MOH 
compared to CTR, the difference is much more pronounced and statistically significant for 
male passengers (37.5% vs. 14%; p = 0.004, Fisher’s exact test), so that in the presence of 
moral hazard the rates of overcharging are very similar across gender. We are thus led to 
conclude that the effect of the moral hazard manipulation on overcharging is mainly driven by 
the subgroup of male passengers.   
Although overcharging is more frequent in treatment MOH, conditional on 
overcharging having taken place the amount by which drivers artificially increased the 
payable fare is lower in this treatment than in the control (€3.53 vs. €4.81). The mean 
overcharging amount by treatment and gender is also shown in Table 3. This finding is 
somewhat surprising. It must be noted, however, that it is not significant, as the following 
section with econometric estimations will reveal. The amount of overcharging does not differ 
significantly by gender. 
Given the substantially higher overcharging frequency in the moral hazard treatment 
and the absence of a significant treatment difference with respect to overtreatment, it is 
natural to expect that second-degree moral hazard will have a positive overall impact on the 
total price paid by passengers, thereby reducing consumer surplus. Indeed, this turns out to be 
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the case. Table 4 reports the price index by treatment and gender, defined in a way analogous 
to the overtreatment index (the price paid divided by the minimum price in that particular 
quadruple). The mean value of the index is higher in MOH than in CRT, and the difference is 
weakly significant (p = 0.067; Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Graphically this impression is 
confirmed in Figure 1, which shows that the cumulative distribution function of the price 
index in treatment MOH first-order stochastically dominates that in treatment CTR. This 
information is useful in its own right since it implies that consumer expenditures will be 
higher in the presence of moral hazard, ceteris paribus (even if it does not convey information 
about the source of the price increase).  
 
Table 4 and Figure 1 about here 
 
3.3. Econometric Analysis 
Econometric estimations confirm all of the above insights. Given the absence of a treatment 
difference in the overtreatment dimension of fraud, we restrict our attention to overcharging 
and the total price paid. Table 5 reports the results from three regression specifications. In 
column (1) the dependent variable is the overcharging indicator and the model used is the 
Probit; in (2) we use a truncated regression to estimate the amount of overcharging, 
conditional on a positive value of the overcharging indicator. Hence, the first two columns of 
Table 5 correspond to the two stages that are implicit in the driver’s charging decision, and 
which can be attributed to the same latent variable determining the strength of the driver’s 
propensity towards fraud in this dimension. First the driver decides whether to overcharge a 
passenger, and then, if so, by how much. Finally, in the third specification we use a Tobit 
model with the price index as the dependent variable (left-censored at 1). In all three models 
standard errors are clustered by quadruple, in order to account for the interdependencies 
among the four simultaneous rides. We also include route fixed effects, since some routes (in 
particular the relatively longer ones) are more susceptible to fraudulent behavior by drivers.13 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
                                                 
13 All of the results that are presented in this section are robust to alternative specifications, such as experimenter 
fixed effects, time fixed effects, or the inclusion of further explanatory variables (driver’s age, vehicle type, 
weather conditions etc.). These additional explanatory variables are always insignificant and lead to a 
worsening of the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria. 
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The Probit regression on overcharging shows that its likelihood increases by 29% in 
the treatment with moral hazard. At the same time, the positive and highly significant 
coefficient on female passengers indicates that women are 22.9% more likely than men to 
face overcharging in the control treatment. However, as we have already seen, behavior 
towards female passengers is far less responsive to our treatment manipulation – something 
that is captured by the large negative coefficient on the interaction term. In the truncated 
regression on the overcharging amount the moral hazard treatment dummy has a negative 
coefficient, consistent with the means reported in Table 3; nevertheless, the coefficient is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that moral hazard affects the decision 
on whether to overcharge a customer, but – conditional on overcharging – the extent of fraud 
remains largely unaffected. 
In line with the qualitative differences observed in Table 4, the moral hazard treatment 
leads to a higher total price for customers. The difference amounts to 6.7% and is weakly 
significant (p = 0.066). One must keep in mind that the effect of MOH on the price index is 
the sum of three partial effects, namely the strong positive and highly significant impact on 
the likelihood of overcharging, the negative but insignificant impact on its amount, and the 
negligible impact on the distance driven (overtreatment). As it turns out, in the end the service 
is provided for a higher price in the presence of moral hazard. 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Overtreatment versus Overcharging 
We have documented the presence of strong treatment differences with respect to 
overcharging behavior and in particular the frequency with which the phenomenon occurs. On 
the other hand, the value of the overtreatment index is almost identical across treatments. 
Why is it that drivers only change their behavior in the former fraud dimension, but not in the 
latter? One plausible and straightforward explanation is that overcharging is more lucrative 
and increases the driver’s income without any additional costs such as fuel costs, depreciation 
etc. Therefore, provided a driver believes that his (or her) passenger will not complain about a 
price increase due to fraud in treatment MOH, he (or she) should resort to overcharging in 
order to achieve this price increase. 
 A further explanation for the observed data pattern relies on the opportunity costs of 
time. In particular, it is reasonable for a driver to expect that a passenger in the moral hazard 
treatment – but not in the control treatment – does not mind paying a higher price, but that the 
passenger does mind being taken on a detour because he or she bears a cost in the form of the 
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longer duration of the ride. Then, a driver who wants to increase income and at the same time 
reduce the likelihood of being confronted by a passenger should overcharge the passenger, but 
not overtreat him. 
4.2. Alternative Explanations for the Observed Treatment Differences 
Our main research hypothesis and the experimental design are based on the premise that 
service provision in credence goods markets is affected by second-degree moral hazard as we 
have defined it in the introduction. Hence, our explanation for the higher prices and 
overcharging frequencies in treatment MOH is that passengers in that treatment are perceived 
as less likely to exert control on the taxi driver, because they have revealed that their expenses 
are reimbursed by their employer. This means that fraudulent behavior is more likely to go 
undetected or unreported. Anticipating this, expert sellers exercise fraud more frequently. 
Nevertheless, we must acknowledge the existence of other possible explanations, which could 
to some extent be driving the treatment differences observed in the data.   
 
The Role of Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) is another much-studied 
consequence of asymmetric information. It implies that, when agents have private information 
about their risk types, high-risk agents are more inclined to buyextensive insurance coverage 
than low-risk ones. A direct implication of this tendency is a positive correlation between the 
extent of insurance coverage and the ex post realizations of risk in a given market. The 
empirical literature on asymmetric information and its impact on market outcomes has 
difficulties to distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard, since both predict a 
positive correlation between coverage and ex post realizations of risk, albeit through very 
distinct mechanisms.14 Adverse selection implies that high-risk agents ex ante self-select into 
contracts with more extensive coverage, while moral hazard means that agents may increase 
their risk ex post because they possess more extensive coverage. Our experimental 
methodology rules out adverse selection because agents (passengers) do not choose between 
the two treatments, but are randomly assigned to one of them. This allows us to sidestep the 
problem of disentangling moral hazard from adverse selection, which we view as a further 
advantage of our study. 
                                                 
14 For instance, Chiappori and Salanié (2000, p. 60) acknowledge that “the general problem of distinguishing 
between adverse selection and moral hazard from insurance data is left for future research [.]” A recent attempt 
to disentangle the two phenomena using automobile insurance data from France is found in Dionne et al. 
(2013). 
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Firms versus Individuals: Distributional Preferences  
It could be argued that drivers are more willing to overcharge passengers who are having their 
expenses reimbursed by a firm not because of the role of second-degree moral hazard, but due 
to the fact that firms are considered as wealthier than individuals. If this is the case and if 
drivers are motivated by convex distributional preferences then they might be inclined to 
charge more when a firm is liable for the payment. This argument could be substantiated by 
referring to the experimental evidence indicating that distributional preferences are 
behaviorally relevant in many important market and non-market transactions (see Cooper and 
Kagel, 2012, for a recent survey), and that subjects in the lab indeed decide in conformity 
with convex distributional preferences (see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 
2000; or Charness and Rabin, 2002, for instance). While this is a plausible argument, we note 
that in Balafoutas et al. (2013) we have explicitly tested for the impact of distributional 
preferences on service provision in this particular (taxi) market and have failed to find 
evidence to support such an impact on overtreatment or overcharging decisions. 
 
Firms versus Individuals: Morality of Fraud and Social Distance 
Another reason why drivers might be more inclined to overcharge clients who are being 
reimbursed by their employer is that they feel more comfortable when the victim of fraud is 
eventually an anonymous entity, as opposed to a specific individual. This could be based 
either on moral considerations that make a driver more reluctant to steal from an individual 
than from a legal entity, or on social distance that makes the driver more reluctant to steal 
from someone who he (or she) directly interacts with than from an anonymous third party.15 
While we cannot entirely rule out such explanations for our treatment differences, we note 
that they cannot explain why we observe treatment differences only in overcharging, and not 
in overtreatment decisions by drivers. On the contrary, we have argued in section 4.1 that an 
explanation based on moral hazard on the consumer’s side is consistent with the specific 
pattern we see in the data. In any case, even if those alternative explanations for the treatment 
differences matter, the implications of our findings would remain the same: Market 
participants who are perceived as having their expenses covered by an anonymous legal 
person will be more likely to face overcharging than those who are paying for the service 
themselves, resulting in more frequent fraud and higher overall expenditures in the market. 
                                                 
15 On the effects of social distance on behavior, see, for instance, Charness, Haruvy and Sonsino (2007) or 
Goette, Huffman and Meier (2012). 
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5. Conclusion 
We have presented a field experiment on fraud in a market for a credence good – taxi rides in 
an unknown city. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first controlled field experiment to 
study moral hazard and how it affects market outcomes. Our setting has allowed us to 
examine the impact of what we have called second-degree moral hazard on the provision of 
this good. By doing so we have studied the supply side, rather than the consumer side, and 
how it reacts to moral hazard on the side of the consumer. We consider the latter an important 
extension of the existing literature because the welfare consequences of this indirect effect of 
moral hazard might even exceed those of the direct effect. In the context of credence goods 
markets, this mechanism is particularly relevant because the informational asymmetries 
present in such markets facilitate supplier-induced demand, or even fraud.  
In our experiment we find that our moral hazard manipulation has an economically 
important and statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood of overcharging, with 
passengers in that treatment being about 13% more likely to pay higher-than-justified prices 
for a given ride. This indicates that second-degree moral hazard may have a substantial impact 
on service provision in a credence goods market. Interestingly, but in line with our hypothesis, 
we find no treatment effect on overtreatment, which is measured as the amount of detours 
taken by taxi drivers. Indeed, the distance seems to be unaffected by moral hazard, while the 
likelihood of cheating on the bill increases substantially. 
Our findings are consistent with anecdotal evidence that perceived moral hazard leads 
to higher bills, and thus higher costs in the health care system. For instance, the health care 
system in Germany is allegedly prone to physicians inflating patients’ bills through adding 
services on the bill which have not been provided.16 Given that patients do not need to worry 
about the bill when they are insured because insurance companies reimburse the physicians’ 
bills, this is perhaps not surprising. Moreover, as we have argued in the introduction, full 
reimbursement of expenses may lead to inflated bills for firms due to their employees having 
weak incentives to minimize costs in a number of credence goods situations ranging from a 
simple taxi ride – like in our design – to high repair costs for company cars or computers. In 
all of these cases, we have argued that part of the problem can be found in the employee’s 
weak incentive to exert control on the behavior of an expert seller, which may induce the 
                                                 
16 See, for example, a report in the German weekly magazine “Der Spiegel“ from 23 December 2012 in which 
the yearly damage to insurers from faked and inflated bills is estimated to account for 6 to 24 billion Euro. 
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/krankenkassen-detektive-jagen-betruegerische-aerzte-mit-spezialsoftware-a-
873059.html 
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latter to increase the extent or the price of the service. Yet, so far there has been no study that 
systematically – and under controlled conditions – has shown how second-degree moral 
hazard influences the supply side in a credence goods market. Our paper has taken a first step 
in doing so.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
TABLE 1. 
Number of Observations by Treatment and Gender 
treatment CTR MOH total 
male passengers 64 64 128 
female passengers 64 64 128 
total 128 128 256 
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TABLE 2 
Overtreatment Index (Alternative Overtreatment Index in Parentheses) 
 CTR MOH total 
male passengers 1.076 (1.119) 1.066 (1.110) 1.071 (1.115) 
female passengers 1.060 (1.104) 1.076 (1.121) 1.068 (1.113) 
total 1.068 (1.112) 1.071 (1.116) 1.070 (1.114) 
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TABLE 3 
Overcharging Frequency (Mean Overcharging Amount in Parentheses, in €) 
 CTR MOH total 
male passengers 0.141 (6.32) 0.375 (3.62) 0.258 (4.36) 
female passengers 0.313 (4.14) 0.328 (3.42) 0.320 (3.77) 
total 0.227 (3.53) 0.352 (4.81) 0.289 (4.03) 
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TABLE 4 
Price Index 
 CTR MOH total 
male passengers 1.097 1.140 1.118 
female passengers 1.119 1.145 1.132 
total 1.108 1.142 1.125 
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TABLE 5 
Regressions on Overcharging and Price 
 
(1) 
Probit  
(marginal effects) 
(2) 
truncated 
regression 
(3) 
Tobit  
(marginal effects) 
dependent variable 
overcharging 
indicator 
overcharging 
amount 
price index 
moral hazard 
0.290 *** 
(0.087) 
-1.602 
(1.238) 
0.067 * 
(0.036) 
female 
0.229 *** 
(0.068) 
-2.209 
(1.685) 
0.028 
(0.036) 
female x moral haz. 
-0.232 *** 
(0.071) 
2.966 * 
(1.639) 
-0.040 
(0.054) 
fixed effects route route route 
N 256 74 256 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by quadruple.  
*, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 1% level, respectively. 
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FIGURE 1 
Cumulative Distribution Function of Price Index, by Treatment 
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Appendix
 
 
TABLE A.1 
Origins and Destinations 
Name Description 
Airport E. Venizelos International Airport 
Glyfada high-income suburb, southern Athens 
Karaiskaki Square run-down neighborhood (central) 
Kifissia high-income residential suburb, northern Athens 
Port (Piraeus) main commercial and tourist port 
Syntagma central square, foreigner area 
Train Station main train station, all intercity trains (origin only) 
Evangelismos central Athens 
Bus station main bus station, services mainly to southern and central 
Greece 
Pagrati central residential area (origin only) 
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TABLE A.2 
Routes
# Origin Destination 
1 Pagrati  Port 
2 Port Karaiskaki Square 
3 Karaiskaki Square Kifissia 
4 Kifissia Syntagma 
5 Train Station Port 
6 Port Bus station 
7 Bus station Port 
8 Evangelismos Glyfada 
9 Glyfada Evangelismos 
10 Airport Glyfada 
11 Glyfada Airport 
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Picture A.1: GPS satellite logger used during taxi rides 
 
 
  
 
